What are the principles of political obligation?
Political obligation thus refers to the moral duty of citizens to obey the laws of their state. In cases where an act or forbearance that is required by law is morally obligatory on independent grounds, political obligation simply gives the citizen an additional reason for acting accordingly.
What are the types of political obligation?
Note: There are three types of conceptions of political obligation: transactional accounts, natural duty, and associative theories. To believe that political obligations require any further justification is to misunderstand what it means to be a member of a political society.
Are there moral obligations to follow the law?
Some legal philosophers argue that there a general moral obligation to obey the law- that the fact that a law demands certain behaviour should be morally important to us regardless of what the law actually says.
What does morally obligated mean?
Definitions of moral obligation. an obligation arising out of considerations of right and wrong. “he did it out of a feeling of moral obligation” type of: duty, obligation, responsibility. the social force that binds you to the courses of action demanded by that force.
What do you mean by political obligation?
The moral obligation to obey the law, or as it is generally called, political obligation, is a moral requirement to obey the laws of one’s country. Traditionally, this has been viewed as a requirement of a certain kind, to obey the law because it is the law, as opposed to the content of particular laws.
Who wrote principle of political obligation?
Thomas Hill Green’s
The present work is Thomas Hill Green’s account of his conception of ‘the common good’ and its importance in determining a set of criteria that will give us the means to evaluate the conduct of political establishments.
What are the two main problems that traditionally comprise the problem of political obligation?
As a theory of political obligation, divine command faces two general problems. First, it presupposes the existence of divinity of some sort; and second, the commands of the divine being(s) are not always clear.
What is political obligation in political science?
What is the difference between moral and legal obligation?
The main difference between moral duty and legal duty is that moral duty does not consider the law, while legal duty does consider the law of a country. A duty is a responsibility or an obligation. Duties arising from ethics or morality are called moral duties, while duties created by the law are called legal duties.
Why is political obligation important?
The moral obligation to obey the law, or as it is generally called, political obligation, is a moral requirement to obey the laws of one’s country. Unless citizens have moral requirements to obey the law, the state may be able to compel obedience but is acting unjustly and impinging on their freedom in doing so.
What are the principles of sufficient moral reason?
Principles of Moral Reasoning The Principles of Sufficient Moral Reason If an action is morally permissible, then there exists a moral reason that suffices to explain why the action is morally permissible. If an action is morally obligatory, then there exists a moral reason that suffices to explain why the action is morally obligatory.
What is political obligation in philosophy?
Political Obligation. To have a political obligation is to have a moral duty to obey the laws of one’s country or state. On that point there is almost complete agreement among political philosophers.
Do citizens have a moral obligation to obey the law?
In all of these cases, citizens’ duty to obey the law ultimately depends on a consideration other than their membership in the polity. The task of morally justifying political obligation bottoms out not in the fact of association but in a moral principle external to it.
What are the best books on moral principles and political obligations?
Moral Principles and Political Obligations, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. –––, 1987. “The Anarchist Position: A Reply to Klosko and Senor,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 16: 269–79. –––, 2001. Justification and Legitimacy: Essays on Rights and Obligations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. –––, 2005.